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Abstract
We propose a new VAR identifi cation scheme that enables us to disentangle immigration shocks 
from other macroeconomic shocks. Identifi cation is achieved by imposing sign restrictions on 
Norwegian data over the period 1990Q1 - 2014Q2. The availability of a quarterly series for 
net immigration is crucial to achieving identifi cation. Notably, immigration is an endogenous 
variable in the model and can respond to the state of the economy. We fi nd that domestic 
labour supply shocks and immigration shocks are well identifi ed and are the dominant drivers 
of immigration dynamics. An exogenous immigration shock lowers unemployment (even 
among native workers), has a small positive effect on prices and on public fi nances, no impact 
on house prices and household credit, and a negative effect on productivity.
Keywords: labour supply shocks, immigration shocks, job-related immigration, identifi cation, VAR.
JEL classifi cation: C11, C32, E32.
Resumen
Proponemos un nuevo esquema de identifi cación VAR que nos permite separar perturbaciones 
migratorias de otras perturbaciones macroeconómicas. La identifi cación se logra imponiendo 
restricciones de signo a datos noruegos para el período I TR 1990-II TR 2014. La disponibilidad 
de series trimestrales para la inmigración neta es crucial para lograr identifi cación. En particular, 
la inmigración es una variable endógena en el modelo y puede responder al estado de la 
economía. Encontramos que las perturbaciones de oferta de mano de obra doméstica y las 
perturbaciones migratorias están bien identifi cadas y son los principales impulsores de la 
dinámica migratoria. Una perturbación exógena de inmigración reduce el desempleo (incluso 
entre los trabajadores nativos), tiene un pequeño efecto positivo sobre los precios y sobre las 
fi nanzas públicas, no afecta a los precios de la vivienda ni al crédito de los hogares y tiene un 
efecto negativo sobre la productividad.
Palabras clave: perturbaciones de oferta de trabajo, perturbaciones de inmigración, 
inmigración laboral, identifi cación, VAR.
Códigos JEL: C11, C32, E32.
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1 Introduction
During the past decades immigration flows have increased significantly in most advanced
economies. This is certainly the case for Norway, where the population share of immi-
grants has increased from approximately 3.5 percent in 1990 to over 12 percent in 2014.
While a large literature has studied in detail the effects of immigration flows on employ-
ment and wages using mostly disaggregate data, the impact of immigration on standard
macroeconomic variables has not been investigated systematically. This paper aims at
filling this gap. We conduct our analysis using Norwegian data as Norway is one of the few
countries for which a quarterly net immigration series is available from the early 1990s.
Our goal is to include a net immigration variable into a Vector Autoregression (VAR)
model, which is the most widely used empirical model for macroeconomic analysis. No-
tably, immigration is a fully endogenous variable in our set-up and responds to exogenous
immigration shocks but also to a series of macroeconomic disturbances driving the busi-
ness cycle. Following the seminal contributions of Canova and De Nicolo´ (2002), Faust
(1998), Fry and Pagan (2011), Peersman (2005) and Uhlig (2005), our identification strat-
egy is based on imposing a limited number of sign restrictions on macroeconomic variables
to disentangle immigration shocks from other sources of business cycle fluctuations. Our
main contribution is to investigate the impact of immigration shocks on selected variables
that we leave unrestricted in the estimation, such as unemployment, a measure of the
state of public finances, house prices, household credit growth, prices and exchange rates
and a measure of productivity. Furthermore, we are able to quantify the relative impor-
tance of immigration shocks for macroeconomic dynamics and evaluate the strength of
the endogenous response of immigration to the other shocks identified in our system.
As already anticipated, our analysis is feasible since Norway is one of the few countries
for which a quarterly net immigration series is available from the early 1990s. This series,
plotted in Figure 1, is provided by Statistics Norway and has been used by Gjelsvik, Ny-
moen and Sparrman (2015) to analyze the impact of immigration on the wage formation
system. We include in our analysis only the net flow of workers immigrating to Norway
from EU/EFTA countries, North America, Australia, New Zealand and Eastern Europe
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in percent of the population aged 15-74. We exclude from our analysis immigrants from
Africa, Asia (including Turkey) and South and Central America since our identification
assumptions are most likely violated for immigrants that do not enter rapidly into the
labor force (as is the case for asylum seekers, for example). The case of Norway is particu-
larly interesting as immigration was a marginal phenomenon in the 1990s (cf. Figure 2),
whereas it became the dominant driver of population growth in the aftermath of the EU
enlargement to include Eastern European countries (cf. Grang˚ard and Nordbø, 2012). In
addition, Norway is an interesting laboratory to disentangle the immigration shock from
two other labor market shocks. The first is a domestic labor supply shock that turns
out to be particularly important, as participation is cyclical and volatile in Norway. The
second is a wage bargaining shock that may have a structural interpretation in Norway
given the centralized nature of the wage negotiation system (cf. Aukrust, 1977), in which
the wage norm is determined in the sector exposed to international competition (wage
leader) and is then used to guide wage increases in the other sectors of the economy (wage
followers).
We disentangle the three labor market shocks (wage bargaining, domestic labor sup-
ply and immigration shocks) from business cycle shocks by assuming that they imply a
negative co-movement between output and real wages. Our assumption finds theoretical
support in recent macroeconomic models (cf. Gal´ı, Smets and Wouters, 2011, and Foroni,
Furlanetto and Lepetit, 2015) and empirical support in studies investigating the impact
of immigration in Norway (cf. Bratsberg and Raaum, 2012, and Bratsberg, Raaum, Røed
and Schøne, 2014). To identify the wage bargaining shock we use data on the participa-
tion rate and assume that a wage bargaining shock that lowers the real wage also reduces
the participation rate. To separate domestic labor supply shocks from immigration shocks
we rely on a restriction on the ratio of immigrants over participants that is naturally pro-
cyclical in response to an expansionary immigration shock and countercyclical in response
to an expansionary domestic labor supply shock. In addition to the three shocks originat-
ing in the labor market, our baseline set-up includes a business cycle shock that moves
output and real wages in the same direction and that is supposed to capture shocks that
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do not originate in the labor market (such as demand shocks, oil shocks and productivity
shocks).
We estimate several versions of our baseline model introducing one alternative unre-
stricted variable in each experiment. This strategy enables us to investigate the macroeco-
nomic effects of immigration shocks on variables such as unemployment, public finances,
house prices, household credit, prices, exchange rates and productivity. The analysis
of the drivers of immigration and the effects of immigration shocks on macroeconomic
variables constitute the key contributions of this paper.
In terms of impulse responses, several results emerge from our analysis. First, an
exogenous increase in immigration lowers the unemployment rate and even the unem-
ployment rate for native workers. Second, a positive immigration shock increases public
spending in the medium run, but the response of fiscal revenues follows the same path
and the net effect on public finances turns out to be even positive in the short run and
neutral in the long run. Third, the immigration shock has no effect on house prices, which
are mainly driven by business cycle shocks, but also by domestic labor supply shocks that
generate a negative conditional correlation between house prices and immigration. Thus,
if anything, immigration has had a mitigating effect on the housing boom that Norway
has experienced in our sample period. The same result is confirmed when we consider
household credit growth. Fourth, an expansionary immigration shock has no effect on
domestic prices but results in an increase in the CPI in the medium run through an ex-
change rate depreciation. Fifth, labor productivity falls in response to an immigration
shock.
In terms of variance decompositions, our main result is that immigration shocks are
non-negligible (although not major) drivers of the Norwegian business cycle, explaining on
average around 15-20 percent of output fluctuations. Immigration responds little to the
state of the business cycle in Norway, whereas it reacts more to factors that are specific to
the Norwegian labor market: when participation by native workers is low (i.e. in response
to a negative domestic labor supply shock), immigration increases significantly.
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limited, perhaps due to the absence of reliable quarterly series for net immigration over
a sufficiently long period for many countries. Mandelman and Zlate (2012) propose a
dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) model with immigration focusing on the
role of remittances for business cycles in Mexico. Earlier contributions include Canova
and Ravn (1998), who study the macroeconomic impact of a flow of unskilled migrants
in the neo-classical growth model, and Bentolila, Dolado and Jimeno (2008), who show
how immigration flattens the slope of the New Keynesian Phillips curve for prices in
Spain. In the VAR literature, Kiguchi and Mountford (2013) provide an analysis on
US annual data using the penalty function approach in which a shock to the working
population (that could be due to immigration but also to domestic factors) leads to
a temporary reduction in GDP and consumption per capita. D’Albis, Boubtane and
Coulibaly (2015) use monthly data for France over the sample period 1994-2008 in a VAR
identified with a recursive scheme. They find that immigration responds significantly
to France’s macroeconomic outlook and at the same time immigration itself increases
GDP per capita, particularly in the case of family immigration. The closest papers
to our analysis are two recent and interesting analyses on New Zealand data. In the
first, McDonald (2013) studies the effect of an immigration shock on house prices in a
VAR identified with a recursive scheme. He shows that an immigration shock has a
strong positive effect on house prices and construction activity, thus boosting aggregate
demand even more than aggregate supply. The second paper, Armstrong and McDonald
(2016), extends the previous set-up to include a second immigration shock associated
with fluctuations in Australian unemployment. They find that higher net immigration
due to a higher Australian unemployment rate leads to a higher unemployment rate in
New Zealand, whereas higher net immigration for other reasons reduces unemployment
in New Zealand. Our contribution to this previous literature is the identification of an
immigration shock that is distinct from other shocks using a minimum amount of sign
restrictions.
The literature on immigration in the context of macroeconomic models is surprisingly
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While we could find only a few DSGE and VAR studies on the macroeconomic ef-
fects of immigration, the literature using more disaggregate data is extremely rich (for a
survey cf. Kerr and Kerr, 2011, and Hagelund, Nordbø and Wulfsberg, 2011). Selected
issues of interest are the assimilation of immigrants into the host-country labor market
in terms of wages and employment, the identification of displacement effects on native
workers in terms of wages and employment (cf. Friedberg and Hunt, 1995, and Borjas,
2003, among many others), the impact of immigration on public finances (cf. Borjas,
1999, Preston, 2014, Storesletten, 2000, among others), on house prices (cf. Saiz, 2003,
Ottaviano and Peri, 2006, Nordbø, 2013, and Sa´, 2014, among others), on prices and the
composition of demand (cf. Lach, 2007, Cortes, 2008, and Frattini, 2008, among others)
and on productivity (cf. Peri, 2012). While we impose as an identification assumption
that an immigration boom has a dampening effect on wages (in keeping with previous
empirical evidence for Norway), our set-up can shed light on all the macroeconomic issues
listed above in the context of an aggregate time-series approach that is complementary to
analysis based on more disaggregate data and with a microeconomic focus. Notably, the
main advantage of a macroeconomic approach based on sign restrictions over alternative
approaches is the ability to disentangle the exogenous and the endogenous component of
immigration.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents the VAR model and describes
the identification strategy. In Section 3 we propose results for our baseline case with unem-
ployment introduced as an unrestricted variable in the system. Section 4 presents several
extensions to discuss the effects of immigration shocks on public finances, house prices,
household credit, prices, exchange rates and productivity. Finally, Section 5 concludes.
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number of lags we include in the model (5 in our specific case), and ut is the N × 1 one
step ahead prediction error with ut ∼ N(0,Σ), where Σ is the N ×N variance-covariance
matrix.
Given the large number of parameters to be estimated, we use Bayesian methods.
Moreover, the model is specified and estimated with variables in levels, as the Bayesian
approach can be applied regardless of the presence of non-stationarity (cf. Sims, Stock,
and Watson, 1990, for more details on this point). We specify diffuse priors so that
the information in the likelihood is dominant. These priors lead to a Normal-Wishart
posterior with mean and variance parameters corresponding to the OLS estimates. To
obtain identification via sign restrictions, we follow the procedure described in Rubio-
Ramirez, Waggoner and Zha (2010). Additional details about the estimation procedure
are provided in Appendix A1.
In order to map the economically meaningful structural shocks from the reduced form
estimated shocks, we need to impose restrictions on the estimated variance-covariance
matrix. In detail, the prediction error ut can be written as a linear combination of
structural innovations t
ut = At
with t ∼ N(0, IN), where IN is an (N×N) identity matrix and where A is a non-singular
parameter matrix. The variance-covariance matrix has thus the following structure Σ =
AA′. Our goal is to identify A from the symmetric matrix Σ, and to do that we need some
restrictions. Those restrictions are imposed only on impact, following the recommendation
of Canova and Paustian (2011), and are sufficient to disentangle four identified shocks (one
2 The VAR model and the identification strategy
We start from the standard reduced-form VAR representation:
yt = CB +
P∑
i=1
Biyt−i + ut, (1)
where yt is an N ×1 vector containing our N endogenous variables, CB is an N ×1 vector
of constants, Bi for i = 1, ..., P are N × N parameter matrices, with P the maximum
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general business cycle shock and three shocks originating in the labor markets) and a fifth
shock that captures the residual dynamics in the system.
In our baseline estimation exercise we include five series: GDP for mainland Norway
(thus excluding petroleum and ocean transport activities, as is standard in all macroe-
conomic analysis for Norway), the series for real wages (defined as nominal wage costs
per hour deflated by core CPI), the participation rate from the labor force survey, the
immigration rate series (including only the stock of immigrants living in Norway from
EU/EFTA countries, North America, Australia, New Zealand and Eastern Europe in
percent of the population aged 15-74) derived from the net immigration series provided
by Statistics Norway and the unemployment rate from the Norwegian Labor and Welfare
Administration (NAV). A detailed description of the dataset is presented in Appendix
A2. The sample period is 1990 Q1-2014 Q2.
The impact restrictions imposed in our baseline model are summarized in Table 1.
The business cycle shock is defined as a shock that moves output, real wages and the
participation rate in the same direction. Its interpretation as a generic business cycle
shock relies on the fact that both real wages and the participation rate are pro-cyclical
in Norway. It is supposed to capture shocks originating in the oil sector (cf. Bjørnland
and Thorsrud, 2016), different kinds of demand shocks (such as government spending
shocks and monetary policy shocks) and to some extent also technology shocks (although
the response of participation to technology shocks is model-dependent, cf. Christiano,
Eichenbaum and Trabandt, 2015).
The three remaining shocks originate in labor markets: a wage bargaining shock and
two labor supply shocks, one domestic and one driven by exogenous immigration flows.
Table 1: Impact restrictions in the baseline model
Business Cycle Wage Barg. Dom. Labor Supply Immigration
GDP + + + +
Real Wages + - - -
Participation Rate + - + +
Immigrants/Participants NA NA - +
Unemployment Rate NA NA NA NA
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ticipation rate into the system in a meaningful way and it guarantees that the remaining
labor market shocks are not contaminated by shocks originating in the wage negotiation
process (that may also capture fluctuations in unemployment benefits and in matching
efficiency).
Our definition of an immigration shock is rather simple and intuitive: it is a shock
that generates a positive co-movement between output and participation and a negative
co-movement between output and real wages.1
The first assumption implies that ideally we would like to concentrate only on im-
migrants that enter rapidly into the labor force, irrespective of their geographical origin.
However, as the quarterly immigration series from Statistics Norway is only available by
country-groups, we cannot isolate job-related immigration. Nevertheless, by focusing on
immigration from western countries we capture a substantial share of the recent immi-
gration boom, which is mostly job-related (cf. Figure 1). Notably, additional annual
data from Statistics Norway confirm that work is the major motivation for immigration
from the countries included in our analysis, whereas this is not the case for the countries
excluded from our analysis, as it can be seen in Table 2. Moreover, data from 2014 con-
firm that the immigrants included in our series have on average a higher employment and
unemployment rate than natives, thus suggesting a higher participation rate. In contrast,
immigrants from non-western countries exhibit an employment rate substantially lower
than natives and access the country mainly via family reunification or as asylum seekers.
1Note that we use the mainland real GDP series (and not the per-capita series) in the estimation. It
would not be obvious to assume that a positive immigration shock increases GDP per capita.
The wage bargaining shock is defined as a shock that generates countercyclical dynam-
ics in real wages and in the participation rate. These restrictions find strong theoretical
support in a New Keynesian model with search and matching frictions and endogenous
labor force participation, as discussed in Foroni, Furlanetto and Lepetit (2015), but also
in the model of unemployment proposed by Gal´ı, Smets and Wouters (2011). Notice that,
as already mentioned in the Introduction, Norway is the ideal laboratory to study wage
bargaining shocks given its highly centralized system of wage negotiation. While this
shock does not play an important role in our analysis, it allows us to introduce the par-
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Therefore, those immigrants may enter the labor force only with a long delay, in contrast
with our identification assumption for immigration shocks.
Our second identification assumption is that an exogenous increase in immigration
has a negative effect on real wages on impact. This assumption follows from a standard
labor supply-demand framework in which immigrants are expected to lower the relative
wages of natives and previous immigrants for whom they are close substitutes (although
the wages of complementary workers may even increase). While those wage-mitigating
effects of immigration are usually found to be small in the literature (cf. Friedberg and
Table 2: Immigration statistics Norway 1990-2015
All immigrants Included Excluded Natives
Work main reason 34 54 6 NA
Refugees 19 8 34 NA
Family reunification 36 30 46 NA
Other reasons (e.g education) 11 8 14 NA
Employment rate (2014) 63.4 73.0 54.5 69.4
Unemployment rate (2014) 7.1 5.8 9.1 1.5
Share of population (1990) 3.6 1.9 1.6 96.4
Share of population (2014) 12.4 6.0 6.4 87.6
Note: Included are immigrants from EU/EFTA countries, North America, Australia, New
Zealand and Eastern Europe, while excluded are immigrants from Africa, Asia (including
Turkey) and South and Central America. All numbers in this table are in percent
2A continuing controversy on the magnitude of these wage dispacement effects is evident in the liter-
ature (cf. Card, 2005, and Borjas, 2003). Ottaviano and Peri (2012) build on the Borjas framework and
extend it to estimate the elasticity of substitution across different groups of workers. They find a small
and significant degree of imperfect substitutability between native and immigrant workers and conclude
that the long-run effect on wages is small. Here, it is important to emphasize that our identification
assumption relates to the short-run effect on wages and is imposed on average wages rather on native
wages.
Hunt, 1995), more recent studies based on national labor markets for workers of different
skills and work experience tend to find larger negative effects (cf. Borjas, 2003).2 In
addition, and most importantly for our purposes, two recent influential studies on Nor-
wegian data also support our identification assumption as a sensible starting point to
identify immigration shocks. Bratsberg and Raaum (2012) investigate the evolution of
wages in the Norwegian construction sector over the period 1998-2005, a period of rising
immigrant employment in the sector. They exploit the requirements of certifications and
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and with native wages responding more to inflows of immigrants from Nordic countries
than from developing countries, thus reflecting a higher degree of substitutability between
native and Nordic workers.
We complete the characterization of an immigration shock by including the immigra-
tion rate as a separate variable into the system and imposing a restriction on the ratio
of immigrants over participants to disentangle immigration shocks from domestic labor
supply shocks. Somewhat intuitively, we assume that on impact (and only on impact)
an expansionary domestic labor supply shock lowers the ratio of immigrants over partici-
pants, whereas an exogenous increase in immigration increases the same ratio. Note that
we are just assuming that the relative impact of an immigration shock is larger over the
pool of immigrants than over the pool of participants, thus ruling out extreme shifts in
the participation pattern of native citizens. Along the same lines, the response of im-
migration to an expansionary domestic labor supply shock is allowed to be positive or
negative. If positive, however, we impose that the immigration response has to be lower
than the participation response.
Finally, we include a fifth shock to match the number of shocks with the number of
observables. This is a residual shock that does not satisfy the restrictions imposed on
the other four identified shocks. Although it is supposed to capture only the residual
dynamics in the system, the shock has an economic interpretation: it is a shock that
authorizations of skills according to national standards as a source of exogenous variation
across different segments of the construction sector. In fact, those licensing requirements
made it difficult for immigrants to enter some segments (like electrical installation and
plumbing activities) but not others (like carpenter and painting firms). They find that a
10% increase in immigration leads to a decline in wages for native workers by 0.6%. Brats-
berg, Raaum, Røed and Schøne (2014) extend the previous analysis over a longer sample
period (1993-2006) and consider other sectors by using the national skill cell approach (cf.
Borjas, 2003) on data drawn from Norwegian administrative registers. They confirm neg-
ative wage effects with a larger impact on previous immigrant wages than on native wages
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moves output and participation in different directions and output and wages in the same
direction.3 In this way, the system is fully identified.
3 Results
In this section we present results for our estimated baseline VAR model and for a series
of alternative specifications.
3These dynamics are generated by technology shocks in the models by Foroni, Furlanetto and Lepetit
(2015) and Campolmi and Gnocchi (2015). However, participation is pro-cyclical (conditional on tech-
nology shock) in the model by Christiano, Eichenbaum and Trabandt (2015). Given these constrasting
results, we refrain from a structural interpretation of the residual shock. Nonetheless, its presence in the
system is useful, as it allows us to leave the fifth variable in the system completely unrestricted, arguably
an important benefit of our specification.
3.1 Baseline Model
We plot in Figure 3 the impulse responses to an immigration shock in our estimated base-
line VAR model. The responses of all variables are expressed in percent, except for the
unemployment rate that is expressed in percentage points. An expansionary immigration
shock has persistent effects on GDP, real wages, the participation rate and the immigra-
tion rate, despite only restricting the impact response for all these variables. While the
expansionary effect on GDP is sizeable, the maximum effect is achieved well before the
peak in the immigration response. Notably, unemployment declines on impact and more
so after few quarters. This partly reflects the mechanical response due to an increase in
participation, although this mechanical effect is very small. The size of the response is
remarkable and may highlight some complementarities between immigrants and natives.
Such an expansionary effect on unemployment is not necessarily surprising if we consider
that many immigrants (in particular from Eastern Europe) move to Norway with a job
offer. Notably, a decline in unemployment in response to an increase in immigration is
consistent with previous estimates for the US based on a production function approach
(cf. Peri, 2012).
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Poland and Lithuania may also be related to these network effects, in addition of course
to the role played by geographical proximity. In addition, the fact that the GDP response
peaks only after 4 quarters, well before the peak in immigration, may reflect composition
effects leading to a decline in productivity in the economy that may reconcile a substantial
and persistent decline in unemployment with a short-lived effect on GDP. We will explore
this conjecture further in the next section.
In Figure 4 we plot impulse responses to an expansionary domestic labor supply shock.
The dynamics generated by this shock are similar to those generated by an immigration
shock (although substantially more persistent). The important difference is that the im-
migration rate declines (rather than increasing) in response to a positive shock over a long
horizon. The different response of the immigration rate highlights how our identification
scheme is successful at disentangling these two labor market shocks.
The immigration rate responds significantly to the domestic labor supply shock but
is substantially less responsive to the other three shocks (cf. Figure 5). It increases
following a reduction in the bargaining power of workers and an expansionary residual
shock, whereas it declines in response to a business cycle shock. However, all these effects
Let us now try to interpret these dynamics. The hump-shaped response in the immi-
gration rate may be explained by the combination of three factors. First, it may be due
to registration delays. Registration is in fact mandatory only for contracts longer than
six months and it is possible that many workers start working in Norway on short-term
contracts (thus contributing to GDP) and only register once they obtain a longer contract.
Second, the peak after ten quarters may reflect family reunifications. As we have seen
in Table 2, while work is the main reason why immigrants included in our sample come
to Norway, the importance of family reunifications is far from negligible. It is reasonable
to think that a substantial share of these additional immigrants will not enter the labor
force, thus explaining why the immigration rate’s response is more persistent than the
participation rate’s response. Finally, the hump-shaped response of immigration may also
be explained by network effects, i.e. the fact that immigrants from the same country tend
to follow each other. The establishment of large communities of immigrants from Sweden,
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are not statistically significant.4 Notably, immigration exhibits a hump-shaped response
to all five identified shocks, thus extending our previous discussion on delayed registration,
family reunifications and network effects also of other shocks.
These results indicate that immigration responds little to the state of the business cycle
in Norway (and to shocks in the wage negotiation process) whereas it reacts substantially
to domestic labor supply shocks: when participation from natives is low, immigration
increases significantly. The muted response of immigration to business cycle shocks is
somewhat puzzling, but may reflect the flexibility of the native labor force. In fact, the
marginal participants in the native labor force, who are likely to be close substitutes for
4In the Online Appendix we present all the remaining impulse responses. The wage bargaining shock
is set apart from the domestic labor supply shock on the basis of the participation response, which
is negative on impact and essentially flat afterwards. A decline in the bargaining power of workers
lowers unemployment in keeping with the predictions of standard New Keynesian models. In the Online
Appendix we also further disentangle the business cycle shock into two components: a productivity shock
that moves output and prices in opposite directions and a demand shock that moves output and prices
in the same direction. Our main results are confirmed in that extended set-up for which the estimation
is more computationally intensive.
5An important role for labor supply factors in VAR models estimated on US data has been found by
Shapiro and Watson (1988), Chang and Schorfheide (2003) and Foroni, Furlanetto and Lepetit (2015).
Those shocks are supposed to capture mainly demographic factors, but alternative interpretations have
been discussed recently in the literature (cf. Barnichon and Figura, 2015).
labor immigrants, increase native participation in response to a positive business cycle
shock, thus possibly reducing the demand for immigrant workers. The cyclicality of native
participation is enhanced by the fact that schooling is counter-cyclical in Norway.
The importance of labor supply factors for immigration dynamics emerges also from
Figure 6 where we plot the variance decomposition across different horizons as derived
from our model. The immigration rate is driven mainly by immigration shocks and
domestic labor supply shocks. The immigration shock is also a non-negligible (although
not major) driver of GDP and real wages, whereas it is even the main driver of the
unemployment rate. The three labor market shocks grouped together explain an average of
50% of GDP fluctuations and account for a dominant share of unemployment fluctuations.
Such an important role for these shocks is not surprising given the large number of labor
market variables used as observables in the estimation.5
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esting to re-estimate our model using a measure of unemployment for native Norwegians
that has been available since 1995-Q1 rather than the total unemployment rate. Notwith-
standing the difference in the sample period, we remark in Figure 7 that the decline in
unemployment for natives is almost identical to the decline in total unemployment in our
baseline model. All in all, we do not find any evidence in favor of displacement effects. In
contrast, we find positive spillovers that may suggest a high degree of complementarity
between domestic and foreign workers.
We now focus on a few selected results by proposing an extensive sensitivity analysis.
For each case we plot in Figure 8 the response of the unemployment rate to a positive
immigration shock and the variance decompositions for the unemployment rate and the
immigration rate.
In a first experiment, we reconsider the horizon at which we impose the sign restric-
tions. In our baseline, model we impose restrictions only on impact. This assumption
may be more problematic for variables featuring a high degree of stickiness, as may be the
The variance decompositions for output and the labor force participation rate turn
out to be rather similar, reflecting the large pro-cyclicality of participation in Norway.
In contrast, the different profiles of the variance decompositions for output and unem-
ployment (and the limited role of business cycle shocks for unemployment fluctuations)
are perhaps more surprising. Those results are, however, consistent with estimates of
Okun’s law for Norway indicating that a decline in GDP relative to trend of 1% results
in an increase in unemployment relative to trend of only 0.25 percentage points (cf. Ball,
Leigh and Loungani, 2012). While unemployment is less cyclical in Norway than in other
countries, our results show that the unemployment response is relatively large (and the
output response is relatively limited) conditional on immigration shocks. This may relate
to the negative response of labor productivity, which we will discuss in the next section.
3.2 Alternative specifications
A decline in unemployment in response to an exogenous increase in immigration seems to
be in contrast with important displacement effects on natives. Nevertheless, it is inter-
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case for wages. Therefore, we check whether our main results are confirmed in a version
of the model where all the restrictions on wages are imposed at horizon four (and only
at horizon four). The results emerging from the baseline model are broadly confirmed in
this alternative set-up, although the importance of immigration shocks for unemployment
fluctuations is somewhat reduced.
In a second experiment, we use a different wage series in the estimation by focusing
on wages in the construction sector. We thus impose the less restrictive assumption that
only wages in the construction sector decline in response to a positive immigration shock,
in keeping with the micro-evidence of Bratsberg and Raaaum (2012). Our results are
basically unaffected.
In a third experiment we consider a shorter sample period ending in 2004Q1, just
before the EU enlargement to include Eastern European countries. The response of un-
employment is more muted in this case and domestic labor supply shocks are the main
drivers of unemployment. It is reassuring that immigration shocks are less important in
this shorter sample period, as we expect a relevant role for immigration shocks precisely
in the early phase of the EU enlargement.
In a final experiment, we exclude immigrants from Eastern Europe from the immi-
gration series. The response of unemployment is unchanged in this case. Nevertheless,
we note one important difference from our baseline model. The immigration variable is
now driven almost exclusively by immigration shocks or, put differently, the endogenous
response of immigration to domestic labor supply shocks is now minor. This hints at
the possibility that the endogenous component of immigration may be driven mainly by
Eastern European workers that react flexibly to the state of the labor market in Norway.
4 The impact of immigration on key macroeconomic
variables
In the previous section, we studied the drivers of the immigration rate and the effect of an
immigration shock with a special focus on unemployment to discuss potential employment
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in immigrants’ originating countries. Borjas (1999) discusses the welfare magnet effects
that may attract a large pool of immigrants to countries with generous welfare systems.
On the other hand, immigrants may also be net contributors to public finances, especially
if young and highly educated. Storesletten (2000) finds that a reform of immigration
policies alone could resolve the fiscal problems associated with the aging of the baby boom
generation. In particular, he investigates feasible policies in the context of a calibrated
general equilibrium model with overlapping generations and suggests the admission to the
US of 1.6 million 40-44 year-old highly skilled immigrants annually.
We can investigate the impact of an immigration shock on public finances by including
a measure of net fiscal revenues (defined as the difference between tax revenues and public
spending) as an unrestricted variable in our system. The response of public finances
to a positive immigration shock is hardly significant and, if anything, on the positive
side on impact (cf. first line on Figure 9). Notice, however, that when we consider a
measure of public spending in isolation, an exogenous increase in immigration leads to an
displacement effects through the lenses of our empirical model. In this section, we offer
a macro-perspective on some topics that have emerged in the more recent literature on
immigration and that have so far been analyzed only in the context of microeconomic
studies. In particular, we investigate the link between immigration and public finances,
house prices, credit to households, prices and exchange rates, and productivity. In each
experiment, we include a different unrestricted variable as the last variable in the system
at the place of unemployment. The general results emphasized in the previous section
are confirmed in all these alternative experiments. Therefore, the goal of the section is to
discuss only the responses of the variables that are left unrestricted in the system. The
results are shown in Figures 9 and 10, where in each line we present the impulse response
of the variable of interest to a positive immigration shock and to a positive domestic labor
supply shock together with the variance decomposition for the variable itself.
Immigration and public finances. The burden that immigrants may place on
public finances is often one of the popular arguments used to oppose immigration. Social
security programs in host countries (and in Norway in particular) are more generous than
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impact decline in public spending followed by an increase in the medium run with a peak
corresponding to the peak in the immigration response (cf. Figure 3). This medium run
increase in government spending may capture the impact of family reunifications, while
the short run decline may reflect reduced expenses for unemployment benefits in response
to the improved state of the labor market discussed in the previous section. Notably,
the impulse responses for net fiscal revenues and government spending can be reconciled
only with a positive effect on tax revenues in the medium run. Thus, our result confirms
previous findings emerging from the microeconomic literature: the net fiscal impact of an
exogenous increase in immigration is relatively small (even slightly positive in the short
run) but the effects on both public spending and tax revenues are not negligible, possibly
in keeping with the effects discussed in Borjas (1999) and Storesletten (2000). Results
are different in the case of an increase in immigration driven endogenously by a negative
domestic labor supply shock, which generates a negative conditional correlation between
immigration and the state of public finances. In this case, however, it is reasonable to
think that the worsening in public finances is driven by the decline in participation from
natives, and immigration may even mitigate the negative consequences of the shock.
Immigration and house prices. Immigration booms are often associated with
housing booms. McDonald (2013) finds that net migration changes imply large positive
effects on house prices in a VAR identified with a recursive structure on New Zealand
data. Other papers have shown that immigration has a positive impact on average house
prices using disaggregate data from metropolitan areas (cf. Saiz, 2003, Ottaviano and
Peri, 2006).6 Our VAR is the ideal laboratory to analyze the link between immigration
and house prices at the aggregate level by introducing house prices as an unrestricted
variable in the model.
As we can see in Figure 9, according to our model, immigration shocks have no impact
on house prices. Domestic labor supply shocks generate a negative conditional correlation
between house prices and immigration but, as in the case of public finance, it is conceivable
6Notice that recent research has highlighted a negative impact of immigration on house prices within
metropolitan areas in the US and in the UK due to the mobility response of the native population (cf.
Saiz and Wachter, 2011, and Sa´, 2014).
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representing credit accorded in the past and unresponsive to shocks almost by construc-
tion. In light of this observation, we use household credit in first differences as this is a
good approximation for the new credit accorded in the period, a variable potentially more
responsive to macroeconomic shocks. Nonetheless, we find that immigration shocks have
no impact on household credit growth, unlike positive domestic labor supply shocks which
have positive and persistent effects. The variable of interest is mainly driven by business
cycle shocks and domestic labor supply shocks, whereas the role of immigration shocks
and wage bargaining shocks is negligible, thus confirming our previous results for house
prices. We conclude that the exogenous component of immigration does not pose clear
challenges to financial stability, while the endogenous component of immigration (the one
responding to the domestic labor supply factors) is negatively correlated with commonly
used indicators of financial instability.
Immigration, prices and the exchange rate. The effect of an immigration shock
on prices is not obvious. On the one hand, the wage mitigating effects of the increase in
that the surge in immigration may mitigate the decline in house prices in response to a
negative domestic labor supply shock. House prices respond strongly to the business
cycle shock, and to some extent to domestic labor supply shocks whereas immigration
shocks are almost irrelevant for house price dynamics, as it can be seen in the variance
decomposition. More generally, we can conclude that immigration does not seem to play
a big role in driving the recent housing boom in Norway. One possible explanation relates
to the fact that a large share of immigrants is composed of Eastern European workers
active in the construction sector. While many of these workers are unlikely to buy a
house (at least in the short run), their contribution to the supply of new houses may be
substantial.
Immigration and household credit growth. The connection between immigra-
tion and household credit has not been discussed in the literature to the best of our
knowledge. Given the increasing attention devoted to household credit as an indicator of
financial instability (together with house prices), we include it in one of our experiments.
Note, however, that the stock of household debt is a largely predetermined variable, mainly
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labor supply may put downward pressure on marginal costs and thus on prices, depending
on the degree of price rigidity. On the other hand, the size (but also the composition) of
aggregate demand for consumer goods changes with a larger population. If supply adjusts
with a delay, we may expect an increase in prices. Lach (2007) explores the effects of the
massive inflow of Russian Jewish immigrants into Israel during the 1990s and finds that
prices of goods decreased. He attributes this result to the higher price elasticity and lower
search costs of the new immigrants compared to the existing population. Cortes (2008)
considers the effects on non-tradable goods and services (unlike Lach, 2007) in the US and
finds a negative effect, in particular for low skill-intensive services. Frattini (2008) finds
small effects on UK prices: immigration decreases the growth rate of prices for services
and non-traded goods, whereas it tends to increase the prices of tradeable goods.
We introduce a measure of CPI prices as an unrestricted variable in our system and
we find no effect on the impact of the shock (cf. Figure 10). Nevertheless, CPI prices tend
to increase in the medium run. Notably, this effect seems to be driven by a depreciation
of the exchange rate, whereas a measure of domestic prices reacts substantially less to
an immigration shock. While these effects are relatively small, in keeping with Frattini
(2008), we uncover a new channel (the exchange rate channel) that, as far as we know, has
not been discussed in the previous literature. Immigration shocks are important drivers
of CPI prices in the medium run, whereas the sum of three labor market shocks captures
a dominant share of fluctuations in the exchange rate. The effect on the exchange rate
is quantitatively important as immigration shocks explain around 35% of exchange rate
fluctuations at long horizons. In light of these results, investigating the link between labor
supply and the exchange rate in theoretical models seems to be an interesting avenue for
future research. One tentative interpretation is that the exchange rate depreciation may
reflect the impact of remittances.
Immigration and productivity. The impact of immigration on productivity has
been discussed in Peri (2012), who finds a strong positive association between immigration
and total factor productivity (TFP) in US data. The main channel responsible for this
result is task specialization. Peri and Sparber (2009) show that in states with large inflows
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result seems in contrast with the evidence for the US proposed by Peri (2012). To further
investigate this issue, we now try to disentangle the different components of labor produc-
tivity. As shown under general assumptions by Bosler, Daly, Fernald and Hobijn (2016),
labor productivity can be decomposed into TFP, capital intensity and labor quality. We
use data on a measure of TFP (that however does not disentangle labor quality) and on
capital intensity to isolate the effects of immigration shocks on the different components
of labor productivity. In a first experiment, we include our measure of TFP as an unre-
stricted variable in the VAR. We see from Figure 10 that a positive immigration shock
has a significant positive effect on TFP. In contrast, when we include capital intensity, we
find a strong negative effect and immigration shocks are the dominant drivers of capital
intensity. These more granular results are now consistent with Peri (2012) who also find
a positive effect on TFP, possibly driven by task specialization, and a negative (although
not statistically significant) effect on capital intensity. The dominant effect of immigra-
tion shocks on capital intensity in Norway may capture the fact that immigration shocks
of immigrants, natives with lower education tend to specialize in communication-intensive
tasks, leaving more manual-intensive tasks to immigrants. The rebalancing produces task
specialization based on comparative advantages and results in efficiency gains.
In our last experiment, we introduce labor productivity, measured as output per hour,
as an unrestricted variable in our VAR (cf. Figure 10). We find that immigration shocks
lower productivity in the medium run, thus confirming one of the conjectures proposed
in the previous section to explain the short-lived effects of immigration on GDP. Notably,
positive domestic labor supply shocks (associated with a decline in immigration) lead to
a large positive effect on productivity. Therefore, both the exogenous and the endoge-
nous component of immigration induce a decline in productivity. In fact, the variance
decomposition suggests that the indirect effect (associated with the endogenous compo-
nent) may be quantitatively more important to explain the possible negative effects of
immigration on productivity.
A negative conditional correlation between immigration and productivity is not sur-
prising since the two series are negatively correlated over the sample period. However, this
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induce the adoption of less capital intensive and more unskilled efficient technologies. In
keeping with this view, Lewis (2011) finds that US manufacturing plants located in areas
that experienced faster growth in immigration adopted significantly less machinery per
unit of output.
5 Conclusion
The economic impact of immigration is usually investigated in studies using detailed dis-
aggregate data. This paper is one of the first attempts to include net immigration into the
set of standard macroeconomic variables in a VAR model identified with a minimum set
of sign restrictions. Our goal is to disentangle the drivers of immigration and the impact
of immigration shocks on several variables that have been studied in the microeconomic
literature. While a disaggregate approach can be more informative and detailed in sev-
eral dimensions, an aggregate approach is needed to study business cycle fluctuations and
possibly also to discuss some implications for macroeconomic policies.
We do not find any support for some of the arguments recently used against immigra-
tion in terms of native employment displacement effects and burden on public finances.
On the contrary we find that an exogenous positive immigration shock in Norway lowers
unemployment (even among native workers) and has a small positive effect on public
finances in the short run. Moreover, an exogenous increase in immigration has no im-
pact on house prices and household credit growth, a small positive effect on prices in the
medium run and a negative effect on productivity. While the fears for employment and
the balance of public finances seem misplaced, the negative impact on labor productivity
may be worrisome for long-term growth.
We conclude by briefly discussing the implications of our analysis for financial stability
and monetary policy. On the one hand, as already mentioned, the exogenous component
of immigration does not seem to pose clear challenges to financial stability, while the
endogenous component may even have a stabilizing effect. On the other hand, our VAR
framework is not equipped to discuss normative implications for monetary policy. Nev-
ertheless, our analysis may give some indication of the effects of immigration on real
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economic activity and inflation, two key variables for monetary policy. In principle, the
positive impact of immigration on the labor force may lead us to the conjecture that im-
migration has substantial effects on potential output. In practice, however, our analysis
seems to downplay those effects. In fact, the negative effect on productivity limits the
effects of the exogenous component of immigration on potential output, while the en-
dogenous component of immigration reduces the effects of domestic labor supply shocks
on potential output. The effects are larger if we consider the unemployment rate as a
better indicator of real economic activity. As long as the natural rate of unemployment
is relatively stable in response to exogenous variations in immigration, the fall in unem-
ployment may indicate higher capacity utilization. The combination of a medium-run
increase in inflation with higher capacity utilization suggests an expansionary effect of
positive immigration shocks on key target variables for monetary policy.
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Figure 1: Net immigration to Norway in thousand people. Our immigration series in-
clude EU/EFTA countries, North America, Australia, New Zealand and Eastern Europe.
Source: Statistics Norway
Figure 2: Annual change in population Norway. Percent. Source: Statistics Norway
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Figure 3: Impulse responses to an one-standard-deviation immigration shock in the base-
line model. The dashed-dotted line represent the posterior median at each horizon and
the shaded area indicates the 68th posterior probability region of the estimated impulse
responses
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Figure 4: Impulse responses to an one-standard-deviation domestic labor supply shock in
the baseline model. The dashed-dotted line represent the posterior median at each horizon
and the shaded area indicates the 68th posterior probability region of the estimated
impulse responses
Figure 5: Impulse responses of immigration to a one-standard-deviation wage bargaining,
business cycle and residual shock in the baseline model. The dashed-dotted line represent
the posterior median at each horizon and the shaded area indicates the 68th posterior
probability region of the estimated impulse responses
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Figure 6: Median forecast error variance decomposition at each horizon in the baseline
model
Figure 7: Impulse responses of different unemployment measures to a one-standard-
deviation immigration shock where total unemployment in the baseline model is replaced
by unemployment among natives and immigrants respectively. The dashed-dotted line
represent the posterior median at each horizon and the shaded area indicates the 68th
posterior probability region of the estimated impulse responses
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Figure 8: Robustness checks for the impulse response of unemployment to a immigration shock and for the variance decomposition of
unemployment and immigration
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Figure 9: Selected impulse responses and variance decomposition for some variables of interest
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Figure 10: Selected impulse responses and variance decomposition for some variables of
interest
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A Appendix
A.1 Bayesian Estimation of the VAR
We illustrate in this Appendix the econometric procedure we use for the estimation of the
different VAR models presented in the paper.
Estimation procedure
The VAR model described in (1) can be rewritten in a compact way as:
Y = XB+U, (2)
where Y = [y1 . . . yT ]
′, B = [CB B1 . . . Bp]′, U = [u1...uT ]′, and
X =
⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
1 y′0 . . . y
′
−p
...
...
...
...
1 y′T−1 . . . y
′
T−p
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦ .
Finally, for convenience, we rewrite (2) into its vectorized form:
y = (In ⊗X)β + u, (3)
where y = vec(Y), β = vec(B), u = vec(U), and with vec() denoting columnwise
vectorization. The error term u follows a normal distribution with a zero mean and
variance-covariance matrix Σ⊗ IT .
The likelihood function in B and Σ is defined as:
L(B,Σ) ∝ |Σ|−T2 exp
{
−1
2
(β − βˆ)′(Σ−1 ⊗X′X)(β − βˆ)
}
exp
{
−1
2
tr(Σ−1S)
}
,
where S = ((Y −XBˆ)′(Y −XBˆ)) and βˆ = vec(Bˆ) with Bˆ = (X′X)−1X′Y. We specify
diffuse priors so that the information in the likelihood is dominant and these priors lead
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proportional to |Σ|−(n+1)/2. The posterior becomes:
p(B,Σ|y) ∝ |Σ|−T+n+12 exp
{
−1
2
(β − βˆ)′(Σ−1 ⊗X′X)(β − βˆ)
}
exp
{
−1
2
tr(Σ−1S)
}
, (4)
where y denotes all available data.
The posterior in (4) is the product of a normal distribution for β conditional on Σ
and an inverted Wishart distribution for Σ (see, e.g. Kadiyala and Karlsson, 1997 for the
proof). We then draw β conditional on Σ from
β|Σ, y ∼ N(βˆ,Σ⊗ (X′X)−1)
and Σ from
Σ|y ∼ IW (S, ν),
where ν = (T − n) ∗ (p − 1) and N representing the normal distribution and IW the
inverted Wishart distribution.
Identification procedure
In order to map the economically meaningful structural shocks from the reduced form
estimated shocks, we need to impose restrictions on the variance covariance matrix we
estimated.
In detail, the prediction error ut can be written as a linear combination of structural
innovations t
ut = At
with t ∼ N(0, IN), where IN is an (N×N) identity matrix and where A is a non-singular
parameter matrix. The variance-covariance matrix has thus the following structure Σ =
AA′. Our goal is to identify A from the symmetric matrix Σ, and to do that we need to
impose restrictions.
To obtain identification via sign restrictions, we follow the procedure described in
Rubio-Ramirez, Waggoner and Zha (2010). The algorithm has the following steps. First,
to a Normal-Wishart posterior. In more detail, we use a diffuse prior for β and Σ that is
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we compute A as the Cholesky decomposition of our estimated variance covariance ma-
trix. We then compute rotations of this matrix, computing first a matrix Q with a QR
decomposition of X = QR, where X is drawn from X ∼ N(0, IN). Then, we generate
candidate impulse responses from AQ and Bi for i = 1, ..., P and check if the generated
impulse responses satisfy the sign restrictions. If the sign restrictions are satisfied, we
store our impulse response, if not we draw a new X. We iterate over the same procedure
again until we obtain 1000 impulse responses which satisfy our sign restrictions.
A.2 Data sources
This subsection lists the sources of the data series used in this paper. When the original
data series is at a monthly frequency, we take quarterly averages of monthly data. All
data series enter the VARs in logs except for unemployment which enters in percent of
the workforce.
Immigration rate: Stock of immigrants in the country in percent of population aged
15-74. We include immigrants from EU/EFTA countries, North America, Australia, New
Zealand and Eastern Europe. Quarterly gross immigration is collected from Statistics
Norway. Net immigration is calculated using interpolated yearly data for emigration.
The stock of immigrants is accumulated net immigration. Sources: Statistics Norway and
Norges Bank
Real wage: Seasonally adjusted wage costs per hour deflated with the price level (CPI-
ATE). Sources: Statistics Norway and Norges Bank
Participation rate: Seasonally adjusted workforce aged 15-74 in percent of population
aged 15-74 from the Labor force survey. Sources: Statistics Norway and Norges Bank
Unemployment rate: Seasonally adjusted registered unemployment rate from the Nor-
wegian Labour and Welfare Administration (NAV). Sources: Statistics Norway and NAV
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GDP mainland Norway: Seasonally adjusted GDP mainland Norway (volumes) from
national accounts. Source: Statistics Norway
Prices: Seasonally adjusted consumer price index adjusted for tax changes and excluding
energy products (CPI-ATE). Sources: Statistics Norway and Norges Bank
Domestic Prices: Seasonally adjusted consumer price index domestic sources adjusted
for tax changes and excluding energy products. Sources: Statistics Norway and Norges
Bank
Exchange rate: Trade-weighted nominal exchange rate index (I-44) for 44 trading part-
ners. Sources: Thomson Reuters, Ecowin and Norges Bank
Hours worked: Total hours worked in mainland Norway from national accounts adjusted
for population growth. Source: Statistics Norway
Population: Population from 15 to 74. Source: Statistics Norway
House prices: Seasonally adjusted nominal house prices deflated by the CPI-ATE. Sources:
Statistics Norway, Eiendomsmeglerforetakenes forening (EFF), Finn.no, Eiendomsverdi
and Norges Bank
Household credit: Seasonally adjusted C2 for households chained and break-adjusted
deflated by the CPI-ATE and adjusted for population growth. Included in first differ-
ences. Sources: Statistics Norway and Norges Bank
Labor Productivity: Seasonally adjusted GDP mainland Norway (volumes) divided by
hours worked. Source: Statistics Norway
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TFP and capital intensity: Labor productivity decomposed into total factor productivity
and capital intensity using a Cobb-Douglas production function. Data on capital, GDP,
hours and labor income share for mainland Norway are used in the calculation. Source:
Statistics Norway and Norges Bank
Government spending: Total expenditure from the quarterly central government fiscal
account. Seasonally adjusted. Sources: Statistics Norway and Norges Bank
Public finances: Difference between tax income (excluding oil taxes) and government
spending from the quarterly central government fiscal account. Seasonally adjusted.
Sources: Statistics Norway and Norges Bank
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